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INTRODUCTION
The federal estate and gift taxes levy on the gratuitous
transfer of wealth by both testamentary and lifetime disposition.
The amount of the tax depends on the value placed on the
property transferred by the decedent or donor. When the prop-
erty transferred consists of shares of stock in a closely held
corporation, there often exists no ready market to help in
valuation. As a result, the value of the shares used to compute
the federal estate or gift tax must be determined first by apprais-
ing the value of the enterprise, and then by allocating some
portion of that value to the shares in question. Occasionally, the
value placed on these shares will differ from the proportionate
value of the enterprise represented by them.
This article deals with two instances of such variation in
value from the proportionate interest of the shares in the closely
held enterprise. One concerns the minority position of the recip-
ient relative to other stockholders. The other concerns shares
which are not freely transferable. Since both of these factors
limit the shareholder's ability to realize fully on the value of the
shares, a discount is frequently applied to such stock when
computing gift and estate taxes.
I. MINORITY INTEREST
For both the estate and gift tax, the tax base is determined
by the fair market value of the property transferred. For estate
tax purposes, section 2031(a) of the Internal Revenue Code1
(Code) and its associated regulations 2 require the inclusion in the
gross estate of the fair market value of all property held at the
time of death, to the extent that the property is swept into the
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B., 1960, Columbia University;
LL.B., 1963, Harvard University. Member, New York Bar.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 203 1(a).
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
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gross estate.3 The gift tax4 and its associated regulations 5 simi-
larly provide that the amount of a gift of property is its fair
market value on the date of gift. Fair market value is defined
generally as "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having-reason-
able knowledge of relevant facts."
6
In the case of corporate stock, the regulations state that
market price is the best proof of value.7 But where reliable
market prices or bid and asked prices are lacking, the stock must
be valued with reference to the corporation's net worth, prospec-
tive earning power, dividend-paying capacity and other relevant
factors. 8
Once the value of the corporation as a whole has been
determined, it is necessary to appraise the value of the shares
being transferred. The regulations, in addition to the obvious
factors, refer to the degree of control of the business rep-
resented by the block of stock transferred as relevant to its
valuation.9 In the most recent elaboration of its position regard-
ing valuation of stock in closely held corporations, the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) listed a series of factors to be taken
into account, one of which is the size of the block to be valued.'0
The ruling states that a minority interest, which is not defined, in
the stock of an unlisted corporation is more difficult to sell than
a similar block of listed stock. It adds that it is equally true that
control of a corporation, representing an additional element of
value, may justify a higher value for a specific block of stock, 1 so
that minority interest presumably is intended to be linked to
control.
The principle that there should be a discount for a minority
interest is entirely appropriate in a proper case. A minority
3Section 2032 of the Code, which permits the executor to elect the alternate
valuation date, incorporates like concepts of value, but may present special problems.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032. See Rev. Rul. 68-154, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 395.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(a).
5Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(a) (1958).
6Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(a) (1958).7 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(b-d) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(b-d) (1958).
8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(f) (1958). This initial
valuation of the corporation is not itself an easy task. See, e.g., Lamson, Factors That Will
Substantiate the Valuation of a Closely Held Corporation, 34 J. TAX. 226 (1971); Vass, Factors
that Are Presently Being Emphasized in Valuing a Closely-Held Corporation, 34 J. TAx. 226
(1971).
9Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(f) (1958). Cf. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (1958).
'0 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237, 239.
n Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237, 242.
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interest in a corporation controlled by others may be worth
significantly less than the liquidation value of the shares. Owner-
ship of shares in a closely held corporation may conveniently be
analyzed as composed of three elements of value: the right to a
proportionate share of the net wealth of the corporation, or asset
value; the right to a proportionate share of distributions from
the corporation, or income value; and proportionate participa-
tion in the management of the enterprise, or control value. The
minority shareholder enjoys the asset value and income value of
the shares. But if he is an outsider, he may not enjoy the control
value attaching to the shares.
The outsider may have no part in making determinations
regarding the day-to-day operating policies of the corporation.
This type of operational control is important in determining
what assets to buy and sell for the corporation, with whom the
corporation does business, and what operations and projects the
corporation should engage in. A frequently occurring example
of the value of participation in operational control is the power
of the controlling shareholders to cause the corporation to em-
ploy them at reasonable salaries and to refuse to employ the
minority shareholders on a similar basis.
12
Another element of control concerns the extent to which a
shareholder can realize immediately on the asset and income
values of his shares. A corporation -generally cannot be com-
pelled by a minority shareholder to pay dividends or to distrib-
ute assets to a shareholder in redemption of his shares, 13 nor can
it be forced to dissolve. The controlling shareholders may restrict
or enhance the flow of dividends as the flow benefits them. To
the extent they find their control position in the corporation
agreeable, they can prevent dissolution of the corporation. If
their controlling interest is great enough they may have the
power to cause dissolution, should they desire to do so.
Assuming that the majority shareholders will not dissolve
the company, the minority shareholder who is an outsider can
retire from his undesirable corporate position and realize on his
stock in two ways. He can sell the stock to another outsider, in
which event the price is likely to reflect a substantial discount by
reason of the "captive" position of the investment in the corpora-
"
2
See generally F. O'NEAL & DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS As-
SOCIATES (1961).
13 Compare Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947), with Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). See, e.g., Note, Minority Shareholder
Suits to Compel Declaration of Dividends, 64 HARV. L. REv. 299 (1950); Note, The Shareholders
Right to Compel Declaration of a Dividend, 10 RocKY MT. L. REv. 201 (1938).
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tion, or he can sell to the insiders. 4 While there may be buyers at
a favorable price if the insiders regard it as desirable to eliminate
outside participation in the affairs of the corporation, the insider
markei is normally restricted. On balance it is fair to conclude
that the price obtainable by the outsider for the minority shares
normally will be substantially less than the pro rata asset and
income values.
If, however, the minority shareholder is not an outsider but
is part of the group which has effective control over the
corporation's activities, the value of his shares is quite different.
Not only will the minority shareholder enjoy the asset and
income values of his stock in the corporation, but he will also
participate in the decisionmaking processes of the corporation.
He may help to determine the corporation's day-to-day policies.
His needs will be taken into account in framing dividend policy.
It may be understood that if the other shareholders in the
control group sell to an outsider, he will have the right to have
his shares included in the block of stock to be sold. To the extent
that there are other minority shareholders who are not partici-
pants in the control group, the value of his shares will be
enhanced by the premium attributable to control over their
investment. In any event, the value of the shares to the inside
minority shareholder is far more likely to approach his propor-
tionate interest in the enterprise than if he were an outsider.
Accordingly, little or no minority interest discount is appropriate
in such a case.
As noted, the regulations include "the degree of control of
the business represented" by the shares as a relevant factor in
their valuation.' 5 This might be taken as an invitation to analyze
the reality of participation in control of the corporation which
the shares confer on their new holder. Attention has focused
instead on an inadvertent semantic formulation suggesting that a
minority shareholding generally should be treated as if held by
an outsider. As the general definition of fair market value, the
regulations adopt the widely accepted statement that it is the
price at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller.16 When applied to stock in a closely
held corporation, however, this general statement can be mis-
leading. Does it suggest that the value put on the shares received
14 Sale to the corporation may be viewed for this purpose as having the same effects
as a pro rata sale to the other shareholders.
IrTreas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(f) (1958).
16Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1965).
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by an "insider" donee or legatee should be limited to what a
willing outsider would pay for them?' 7 If so, the control value of
the shares will be ignored and a substantial minority discount
applied, although the new shareholder donee or legatee partici-
pates actively in control of the corporation. Yet, it is apparent
that substantially more wealth has been conferred on the donee
than he could obtain simply by reselling the stock interest to an
outsider, because an element of the wealth conferred, participa-
tion in control, could not be conveyed to an outsider by convey-
ing the shares.
Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick,'8 a suit to recover overpayment of
gift tax, turned on the value of stock in a family holding
company. The donor, Whittemore, owned all of the 820 out-
standing shares of stock in the company. Whittemore transferred
600 shares to two co-trustees for the benefit of his three sons
severally, retaining 220 shares. One of the trustees was the
donor's son. Whittemore valued the stock on his gift tax return
at $1,000 per share, but the Service asserted a value of $3,228
per share. The issue at trial was how the interest transferred in
the company should be characterized. The Service argued that a
controlling interest had been transferred and that the shares
should be valued proportionally. The taxpayer argued that he
had made three separate transfers of a minority interest, each of
which should enjoy a minority discount.
The court stressed that the number of shares transferred
constituted less than the seventy-five percent needed to liquidate
the corporation, and that the holders of this block of stock did
not have the power to realize immediately on the liquidation
value. As a result, the block of 600 shares transferred was
preliminarily valued at a fifty percent discount from the per
share liquidation value. Then, after analyzing conflicting expert
testimony regarding the nature of the 600-share block trans-
ferred, the court determined that the individual gifts should be
valued as separate 200-share lots rather than as part of a single
600-share block. To take account of the difficulty in marketing
such a 200-share minority interest, the court applied a further
discount. The aggregate discount applied was sixty-six percent
below the liquidation value per share.
17 The Service has sometimes argued, largely unsuccessfully, that the willing buyer to
whom the new donee would sell would be the controlling family group, an argument
which suggests that the hypothetical buyer be treated as a non-outsider. Marian Otis
Chandler, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 387, 392 (1941). But see Bartram v. Graham, 157 F.
Supp. 757 (D. Conn. 1957).
18127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954).
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If we view each of the 200-share blocks in the Whittemore
case as having been the subject of a separate sale to an outside
party, the discount used by the court was entirely appropriate,
because the market for minority shareholdings without propor-
tionate control of the enterprise is extremely limited. But in
Whittemore, the new beneficial owners of the shares had
significant participation in control of the corporation. The three
blocks of stock, representing more than seventy-three percent of
the voting power of the corporation, were under common voting
control. One of the two trustees was himself a beneficiary. 19 Also
there was no evidence that the donor, who retained 220 shares,
and the donees, who together held the remaining 600 shares,
were in an adversary relationship with one another. To the
contrary, the mutuality of interest among them, which may be
inferred from the gift, is likely to have continued. Control of the
corporation remained in the family group. There was no evi-
dence that any block of stock was deprived of its proportionate
participation in corporate control. Accordingly, no significant
discount for minority interest should have been taken on these
gifts. Similarly, a minority discount would be inappropriate if the
donor later passed his remaining 220 shares to family members
by gift or bequest.
The Whittemore court rejected the Service's argument that
the taxpayer, in ascertaining the price at which the donee would
sell the stock to a willing buyer, underemphasized the higher
value which the donee would demand. 20 The court properly
argued that subjective factors, such as sentimental attachment to
a corporation which had long been in the family, should be
ignored in fixing the value of the gift. Participation in control of
the corporation, however, is not an irrational element in deter-
mining value to be lightly set aside as subjective. The problem
was not that the donee's evaluation of the shares was idiosyn-
cratic, but that an element of value transferred from the donor
could not be retransferred to another. It is nevertheless an
element by which the donor enriched the donee, and the court
erred in disregarding it.
When there are special factors demonstrating tlis value to
the donee or legatee, the potential discount for minority shares
has been ignored. In Blanchard v. United States,2' the donor
19 Moreover, the trustees were under a fiduciary obligation not to injure any
beneficiary by favoring another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, comment r,
at 371 (1959). Cf. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136-40 (1972).
20 127 F. Supp. at 715.
21 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
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owned 22.9 percent of the shares of a bank. The members of the
donor's family owned an additional 29.5 percent of the stock
when the donor transferred her shares to six family trusts.
Three weeks later an unrelated party, Life Investors of Iowa,
bought the Blanchard family stock, including the stock held by
the trusts, at a price in excess of $700 per share. Subsequent to
this sale, Life Investors bought stock from nonfamily share-
holders, paying $315 a share. The donor contended that, for gift
tax purposes, the blocks placed in each of the six trusts should be
viewed as four percent stock interests, and valued at the price
paid to the small interests in the subsequent sale. The court
properly held the stock to be part of the controlling Blanchard
family block, to be valued as part of the majority interest in the
bank.
22
A particularly doubtful application of the minority discount
in the face of the realities of control occurred in Obermer v. United
States.23 Husband and wife each owned half of the stock of a
personal holding company. The husband died, leaving the stock
to his wife. The estate contended for a minority-interest discount
of one-third of the per-share liquidation value and the district
court agreed. The court stressed the fact that a fifty percent
interest in the company would not permit an outside purchaser
of the stock to liquidate the corporation in order to reach the
underlying assets, which consisted of readily marketable se-
curities. This solution, however, ignored the fact that the stock
had been held by the husband, and would be held by the wife,
with control of the corporation held at all times within the
intimate family group.
2 4
22 The Government's position was also supported by evidence that at the time of the
transfer negotiations for the sale to Life Investors had progressed sufficiently that the
donor had ample expectations of the price eventually paid. Id.
23 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964).
24 Another problem which concerned the Obermer court was that the corporation's
securities had appreciated so that, on sale by the corporation; substantial capital gains tax
would be incurred. It has been held that the hypothetical expenses of converting
investment assets into cash, such as selling commissions and taxes on appreciation, are
not to be taken into account. Estate of Frank A. Cruikshank, 9 T.C. 162 (1947). See
United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 561-2 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Moreover, it is possible for a shareholder to realize on investment assets without
incurring capital gains tax at the corporate level by way of dividend distributions, most
redemptions, and liquidations. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 311(a), 336.
Finally, the court considered the corporation's status as a personal holding company,
potentially subject to personal holding company tax, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 541 et
seq., as further justification for a discount. In the case of a minority shareholder, however,
this potential tax could be more than offset by the impetus it creates to distribute
earnings to the shareholders, thereby obtaining the benefits of the dividends-paid
deduction, INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 561 & 545(a). An outsider, thus, has greater
assurance than he ordinarily does that he will realize the income value of the shares.
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An example of minority discount correctly applied to a
minority shareholder is Estate of Lillian May Schroeder.25 At her
death, the decedent owned 750 of the 10,000 outstanding shares
in a company, in which a corporation unrelated to the decedent
had a controlling interest. The asset value was $41.84 per share.
While there was virtually no market in the stock, one sale of 100
shares to an insider had recently taken place, in which'the price
paid was $25 per share. The Tax Court, finding a value of $25
per share, held that the sale was the best available indicator of
the value of the stock. Although an isolated sale would generally
be given limited weight in a determination of value, it was
dispositive in this case. While the finding represented a substan-
tial discount from asset value, it properly reflected the true
minority position of the shares bequeathed.
Schroeder represents the exceptional case where the
shareholder was frozen out of control of the corporation and
when an actual sale of shares held by an outsider at a time near
the valuation date resolved the question directly. More typically,
however, the discount is applied without examining whether the
transferee suffers the lack of participation in control which is the
rationale for minority discount. Whittemore and Obermer are not
atypical of the decisions concerning minority discount.26 The
courts generally have determined whether the interest trans-
ferred is arithmetically a minority interest and then, based on
conflicting testimony offered by expert witnesses, have applied
some discount from proportionate asset value.
Consider the implications of this legal pattern in the context
of a transfer of wealth from one generation to another within a
family. Suppose that a parent concerned with the transfer tax
seeks to transfer $1,000,000 to his three children. Assume
further that both his specific lifetime gift tax exemption of
$30,000 and his annual $3,000 exclusion for each child have
25 13 T.C. 259 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CuM. BuLL. 3.
28 See, e.g., Righter v. United States, 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Drybrough v.
United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Bartram v. Graham, 157 F. Supp. 757
(D. Conn. 1959); Estate of Gregg Maxcy, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 783 (1969); Estate of
Harry Stoll Leyman, 40 T.C. 100 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 344 F.2d 763 (6th Cir.
1965), vacated, 383 U.S. 832 (1966); Paulina DuPont Dean v. Commissioner, 19 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 281 (1960); Estate of Charles W. Heppenstall, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 115
(1949); Marian Otis Chandler, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 387 (1941)r But see Hamm v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1963) (court refuses to interfere with Tax Court's
affirmance of Commissioner's valuation, which included some discount from asset value
per share). Especially instructive is the contrast between the Tax Court and the Second
Circuit opinions in H. Smith Richardson, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1577 (1943), aff'd, 151
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946).
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otherwise been exhausted. If the parent gave each child one-
third of the $1,000,000 he would have aggregate gifts of
$1,000,000 on which gift tax would be incurred.
Suppose instead that the donor uses the $1,000,000 to
provide the capital for a new corporation in exchange for all of
its outstanding stock. If he then transfers one-third of the stock
to each child, each gift, under the Whittemore view, should be
entitled to a discount for minority interest. If the discount is a
conservative twenty percent, each gift would be valued at
$266,666, resulting in total taxable gifts of $800,000. Assuming
that there are no other taxable gifts and that the "split gift"
provision 27 is not elected or is inapplicable, the gift tax saving
from this change in form would be $55,500.28
Are the differences in the two gifts great enough to warrant
this difference in tax treatment? In one sense, each child will
have received something quite different in the two transfers: in
the first, $333,333; in the second, a one-third interest in a
corporation capitalized with the donor's $1,000,000. This distinc-
tion could be significant if there were disagreement as to the
management of the corporation, because the interest in the
corporation would be worth less than $333,333 to a child who
lacked control over the business.
If the family were close, however, each child might enjoy the
advantage of consolidated management and might also be able to
realize on the funds as needed. In such a case a shareholder who
needed money could expect to have his shares either redeemed
by the corporation or purchased by the other two shareholders
for his proportionate share of the underlying asset value. Alter-
natively, the shareholders could liquidate the corporation and
each would attain directly one-third of $1,000,000.
While the transfer of shares in a corporation holding noth-
ing but cash may seem fanciful, it is entirely probable that a
parent may wish to transfer an investment portfolio to his
children. The comparison between a transfer of investment
securities to the children directly and a transfer to a corporation
followed by a transfer of the stock of the new corporation to the
27 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2513.
28 If this most extreme of cases, a corporation whose sole asset is cash, concerned an
income tax benefit to the donor rather than a transfer tax benefit, the Commissioner
might have a range of arguments open to him. He might, for example, seek to deny the
claimed benefit under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 269. There is no analogous statutory
provision under the estate and gift tax. Nor does the Commissioner have specific power
to make adjustments to clearly reflect value, similar to that granted under the income tax
by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482, to make adjustments so as to clearly reflect income.
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children would appear to be subject to the same analysis. 29
Similarly, if the asset to be transferred is a family business, the
application of minority discount when the business is incorpo-
rated would seem to be unjustified. To be sure, in the latter case
the corporation may be less liquid than in the other cases, and
therefore less able to allow the shareholders to realize im-
mediately on the underlying value. But this would also be true of
a transfer of undivided interests in the family business directly to
the children.
Analysis of a minority interest in the corporation might be
further refined by examining the relationship of the new owner
of the minority interest with the other ownership interests in the
corporation. If the others also hold minority interests, no one
block of stock has a special control position in the corporation.
To the extent that differences arise, the shareholder alliance
representing control in the corporation may shift from issue to
issue. Each shareholder can, with the aid of others, check the
control sought to be exerted by any other shareholder. Minority
discount would appear particularly inappropriate here, where
the minority "disability" is reciprocal.
But the holder of less than a majority of shares may be a
part of a control group which would have control of the corpora-
tion even without his participation, i.e., a minority insider. In the
event of a dispute between the shareholder and the control
group, the group could overrule him. The opportunity to sell his
shares may be more limited than in the all-minority interest case.
This would appear to be the most appealing case for application
of the discount to shares which are held by a member of the
controlling group.
Neither the regulations and rulings on the one hand, nor
the decided cases on the other, are a substantial help in dealing
with these problems. The former touch on the relationship
between value and control only in an oblique and general fash-
ion. The latter use what can best be termed elusive standards
when applying the minority discount. It has been applied when it
is determined that the block of stock transferred does not consti-
29 An incorporated portfolio has the income tax disadvantage of coming within the
personal holding company provisions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 541 et seq. Yet the
penalty tax can be avoided by making distributions of the corporation's undistributed
income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 561. A further disadvantage is that an additional
income tax on the investment income will be incurred at the corporate level. This tax
burden would be greatly reduced by the availability of the dividends received deduction,
which reduces the effective corporate income tax on dividend income from a maximum
of 48 percent to a maximum of 7.2 percent. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(a).
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tute more than either fifty percent of the stock of the corpora-
tion, or occasionally, the percentage required to force liquida-
tion. This has resulted in discounting value in cases where the
obvious link between the size of the block and control suggested
by the ruling was absent, but where control was nonetheless
transferred. The holdings of the cases fail to clarify the princi-
ples involved.
The potential avoidance of transfer tax, given the confusion
in this area, is substantial. It may be illustrated as follows. To
return to the father who owns all of the stock of a family holding
company, suppose that his gifts are spread over time. He first
gives a third of the stock to one son and retains the other
two-thirds. The recipient has a minority insider interest of the
kind described above. If a minority discount is applied, the
shares will be valued at some amount less than one-third of the
value of the whole corporation.
3 0
Thereafter, in a separate transaction, the father transfers a
second one-third interest in the stock of the corporation to
another son. Now the shares are held in equal blocks by the
three shareholders and should have equal value, one-third of the
value of the corporation. The first son's shares have increased in
value, to reflect the new dispersion of control in the corporation.
By this second gift, then, the father has enriched the second son
directly and the first son indirectly. Failure to treat the en-
hancement in value of the first son's shares as a taxable gift
would result in permanent exclusion of the discount from both
gift and estate taxes.
If this second gift could be taxed in the amount of both
these elements of value, there would be no transfer tax avoid-
ance. Although section 2511 construes "transfer" broadly, to be
subject to gift tax the transfer must be of property,31 and the
amount of the gift is defined as the value of the property
transferred. 2 The difficulty in taxing this increment of value at
the time of the second transfer is that no "property" has been
transferred to the first son, while the property transferred to the
second son is limited in value to the one-third share given him.
The cases appear to support this view in rejecting the notion that
"0 Presumably, the two-thirds interest in the corporation retained by the father
would now be worth a premium over two-thirds of the value of the whole corporation,
the premium being equal to the discount, if the father's interest were valued on death or
other transfer of the shares gratuitously as a block.
31 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501(a)(1).
32 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(a).
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transferring part of a control block results in a taxable gift
greater than the value of the shares to the recipient.
33
This result cannot be avoided by analyzing the later increase
in value in the first son's shares as a transfer incident to the
earlier gift. First, both the estate tax and the gift tax apply on a
"now or never" basis, imposing tax on the value of the property
as best as it can be determined at the time of the transfer.
Adjustments at later dates have not become a part of the transfer
tax system 34 even where the income tax recognizes such adjust-
ments. Second, the augmentation in the value of the first son's
shares by reason of fragmentation of the control held by the
father need not occur incident to a transaction which would
otherwise be subject to estate or gift tax. It could as well derive
from other kinds of transactions. For example, if the father sold
a one-third interest in the corporation to a third party instead of
making a gift of the shares to the second son, the control
position previously held by the father would disappear, and the
value of the shares held by the first son would rise, but with no
resultant gift tax.
If no taxable transfer to the first son is deemed to occur
when shares are given to the second son, the discount taken on
the initial transfer to the first son will be permanently excluded
from transfer taxation. This c6nsideration should weigh heavily
against applying a discount for minority interests in the case of
the "minority insider" where the less than proportionate share of
control in the corporation is contingent and uncertain.
The proper response to this situation may be a presumption
that a donor or decedent, in making transfers of stock in a
closely held corporation which he controls, makes them to trans-
ferees who will be a part of the control group of the corporation.
In order to establish that a minority discount is appropriate, the
proponent of the discount would have to come forward with
evidence that the recipient who is claimed to be a minority
shareholder actually will suffer the disabilities of an outsider.
This burden would generally be difficult to carry where the
minority position is reciprocal.
The presumption against minority discount should apply
a Estate of Charles W. Heppenstall, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1949); Marian Otis
Chandler, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 387 (1941).
31 In Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), the Supreme Court found consideration
received on an exchange to be so contingent and difficult to value as to require the
transaction to be kept open, deferring income taxation until cash or property actually was
received. In the same case, however, there had been an estate tax proceeding in which
the same rights were valued and the estate tax liability was finally determined.
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even where participation in control may be limited by the con-
centration of a majority interest in other hands.3 5 Minority
discount under these circumstances is likely to result in perma-
nent avoidance of estate and gift tax on the transfer of wealth
within the family group. It is not unfair to require the proponent
of a minority discount to justify it by more than pointing to
percentages and claiming that they "prove" a lack of participa-
tion in control.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON STOCK
Shareholders in a closely held corporation frequently im-
pose restrictions on the transferability of stock in the corpora-
tion. Such restrictions may serve a variety of purposes, for
example, to keep ownership and control of the enterprise within
a limited group and to assure that new entrants into the stock-
holding group are acceptable to the other owners.
The restrictions may be imposed by charter provision, bylaw
provision, or separate agreement. They may bind future as well
as current owners of the shares and, to ensure notice of the
restrictions to any subsequent purchaser for value, may require
that the certificates reflect the restriction.
3 6
The character of the restriction will vary depending upon
the purpose to be served. There may be an absolute prohibition
against transfer of the stock for reasonable periods;37 a require-
ment that consent of the other shareholders must be obtained
before the shares may be transferred; an agreement that the
corporation or the other shareholders will buy the shares on the
death of a shareholder or on the occurrence of some other
contingency; or an option which provides that another may
purchase the stock. Frequently, the restriction takes the form of
a right of first refusal, granting to the other shareholders, to the
corporation, or to some other insider group the right to pur-
chase the shares at a determinable price before they can be
transferred.
When the restriction contemplates sale of the shares, the
price may be stated or a formula for ascertaining the price may
be provided. If the price is the fair market value of the shares,
the restriction can hardly be said to affect value. But often the
35Cf. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958).
36See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-204 & 8-301.3 7 A prohibition against transfer for an unreasonably long period would be invalid as
constituting an undue restraint on the alienability of the stock. See Greene v. E.H. Rollins
& Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938).
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price is lower than the proportionate interest in the entire
enterprise represented by the shares.
If the shares are held subject to an option or contract to
purchase, the estate tax regulations provide that the effect of the
price on value depends on the circumstances of the case.38 Little
weight is given an option or contract taking effect only.at death,
if the decedent was free to dispose of the stock at any price
during his lifetime. To prevent the use of an option or contract
as a testamentary device, it is required that the restriction rep-
resent part of a bona fide business arrangement.
Published rulings have amplified the regulations in two
respects. First, if the stock was acquired from the corporation
subject to a charter restriction pursuant to which the corporation
may purchase the stock at a specified price before any transfer,
including a transfer at death, the option price generally will
determine value for estate tax purposes.3 9 The second provides
that if the transferability of the stock was restricted during the
lifetime of the decedent, but the shareholders entered into the
option or agreement voluntarily, the agreement is but one factor
to be considered in valuation and may or may not fix the estate
tax value.
40
With one exception, the Service applies similar rules for gift
tax purposes, stating that a right of first refusal held by another
is one factor to be taken into account, although it is not necessar-
ily determinative of value.41 The exception is that an option
imposed by charter allowing the corporation to purchase the
shares at a specified price before any other transfer can be made
is not strictly determinative of value,42 as it is in the case of estate
taxes.
The form in which the restriction is applied-charter provi-
sion, bylaw or agreement-would seem to be largely a matter of
convenience within the control of the shareholders. It should be
irrelevant for tax purposes which of these forms is used by the
shareholders, provided that the restriction is enforceable and
that all due steps are taken to give prospective purchasers of the
stock notice of the restriction.4 3 The Service position generally
3 8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
I Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1 Cu,!. BULL. 194.
40 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cumz. BULL. 237, 244.
"Rev. Rul. 189, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 294.
'
2 Compare Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237, 243-44, with Rev. Rul. 54-76,
1954-1 CuM. BULL. 194.
43 Insofar as a corporate charter may be amended by less than unanimous share-
holder action, while a contract change requires unanimity, the latter might be thought
more determinative of value.
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reflects the decisional law, except for the preferred status which
the estate tax regulations accord charter restrictions.
44
In analyzing these rules it will be helpful to consider an
example. Suppose that A, B, and C have equal interests in ABC,
Inc. The stock is held subject to an agreement providing that no
shares may be transferred without being offered first to the
corporation and to the other shareholders at book value.45
Further, any shares held by the estate of a deceased must be sold
to the corporation at book value.45 These restrictions bind trans-
ferees and assignees.
The restrictions do not affect the income value of the shares
or their control value. Each shareholder receives the same pro-
portionate share of dividends and participates in the control of
the corporation as he would without the restrictions. They do,
however, limit the asset value, the right to a proportionate share
of the corporation's net wealth, by the difference between book
value and the value of the same interest in the corporation
without restriction. But the effect of this reduction on the
current fair market value of the shares is less clear. It would
appear to depend upon the importance to the shareholder of the
ability to realize on the asset value.
Suppose, for example, that A and B have agreed to waive
their right of first refusal on a proposed transfer by C of his
stock to D, his son. Normally the value of the shares to D would
44 Thus, shares which are restricted during life and which must at death be offered
to others at a fixed price are valued for estate tax purposes at the agreement price. See,
e.g., Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639
(3d Cir. 1938); Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acquiesced in, 1959-2 CuM.
BULL. 5. Where the shares are not required to be offered at death but are only subject to
a right of first refusal, the restriction is but one factor to be taken account of in the
valuation. See, e.g., Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503, 508 (1947). For gift tax purposes,
the restrictions are not determinative, but must be taken into account. See, e.g., Krauss v.
United States, 140 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1944); James v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1945), affg per curiam 3 T.C. 1260 (1944). The Tax Court inJames stressed the
voluntary nature of the agreement and the fact that the option was not specifically
enforceable. Id. at 1264.
'5 The income tax effect of this disposition may vary depending on the nature of the
remaining shareholders' duty to purchase. The Service has litigated a number of cases
concerning the redemption of stock by a corporation, in which the Service contended
that the transaction should be analyzed as a dividend distribution to the shareholders
continuing in the business, followed by a purchase by them of the departing share-
holders' stock. Compare Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 905 (1967), with Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958), rev'g 28
T.C. 962 (1957). The Service relied on the existence of an agreement or other duty on
the part of the shareholders continuing as owners of the corporation to purchase the
shares, which the corporation assumed instead. The Service has announced that it has
abandoned this argument in all cases except those in which the corporation has assumed
the remaining shareholders' "primary" and "unconditional" obligation to purchase the
stock. Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 42.
" Payments may be deferred because of the corporation's insufficient liquidity to
meet so large an obligation all at once.
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be substantially less than the fair market value of the shares
without restriction because he could not be sure of realizing
more than the book value on sale of the shares. But if D expects
to participate in the corporation for the indefinite future, asset
value may be relatively unimportant to him compared with the
income value or the control value of the shares. Furthermore,
though the difference between fair market value and the for-
mula price is currently ascertainable, the size of this difference
when the restriction becomes operative cannot be accurately
forecast. This may render the reduction in asset value of rela-
tively little consequence to the shareholder.47
As noted, the courts have taken the restriction into account
as one factor, though not determinative, to be considered in
valuation. They have attempted to weigh the reduction in asset
value against the "retention value" of the shares to the share-
holder. For example, Estate of Pearl Gibbons Reynolds48 concerned
estate and gift tax deficiencies in a number of related cases
arising from transfers of voting trust certificates. The voting
trust in question held more than fifty percent of the stock of an
insurance company. The trust certificates were subject to a right
of first refusal at a formula price on any sale or pledge of the
stock. The formula produced a price of $317, while the value of
the underlying stock per certificate was $2,300. The taxpayers
relied exclusively on the formula price in valuing the certificates
at $317, while the Commissioner's expert valued them at $1,800
each.49 The Tax Court found a value of $1,600, holding the
47 Another factor that should be taken into account is the likelihood that the
agreement in fact will operate to deprive a shareholder of the value represented by the
fference between the fair market value of the unrestricted stock and the formula price.
While it may be that the other shareholders would enforce the restriction to prevent a
sale to an outside party, sale to the corporation at a price more closely reflective of fair
market value by a retiring shareholder is not inconceivable. Gratuitous transfers by a
shareholder within his own family group are likely to be permitted. See, e.g., Raymond J.
Moore, 3 T.C. 1205, 1207 (1944).
If the restriction is waived on a subsequent transfer by the shareholder a taxable gift
might well result. See generally INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(d)(2), which taxes as income
the increment of value resulting from the cancellation of a restriction, which by its terms
will never lapse, on property received for services.
Cf. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952), taxing as a gift a purported renunciation by a wife and daughter of their intestate
shares in an estate, so that the shares could pass to the son of the decedent. Hardenbergh
distinguished Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933),
which had permitted renunciation of a testate interest without transfer tax consequences
on the ground that the latter amounted to a refusal to accept a benefit, while an intestate
interest vested by operation of law. See generally Feld, Some Post-Mortem Planning Devices:
Renunciations, Elections and Compromises, 3 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAx TECHNIQUES 2191
(1973).
49 55 T.C. 172 (1970).
49 Apparently, both the Commissioner's valuation expert and the Tax Court found
the reduction in asset value produced by the restrictions to be greater than the premium
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formula price to be relevant but not conclusive of value. The
certificates had "retention value" which included, in addition to
dividends and participation in control, rights to the underlying
shares of the insurance company on liquidation of the trust, and
rights to the value represented by the stock in the insurance
company on its liquidation or mutualization.
In our example, the reduction in asset value may be limited
both by the retention value of the stock, i.e., the income value of
the shares and participation in control which the shares carry,
and by virtue of the restrictive agreement itself, since D will
acquire reciprocal rights of first refusal in the shares held by the
others. These rights are valuable. To the original shareholders,
the power to restrict transfers probably outweighed the burden
imposed upon their own shares. Otherwise the three share-
holders initially would not have agreed to restrict their own
shares in exchange for restrictions on the shares of the others.
Similarly, if D intends to retain the shares, the reciprocal restric-
tions on the shares held by A and B may be more valuable than
the restriction on his own shares. This suggests that when restric-
tions are reciprocal it should not be assumed that they reduce
the value of the shares. On the contrary, they probably should
be viewed as offsetting elements of value unless the taxpayer
demonstrates otherwise. If D plans to dispose of the shares,
however, the burden of the restriction on his shares is likely to
outweigh the benefits of restricting the others' shares.
In applying the general definition of fair market value, the
fact that the test is described as a sale could suggest that asset
value rather than retention value should be emphasized. The
decisions do not appear to have done so, but rather have given
balanced weight to both asset and retention values. To a
hypothetical buyer, the additional difficulty in disposing of the
shares produced by the restriction should be offset by the assur-
ance of some control over the entry of new participants into the
venture. It may be that this is reflected in the Service's concern
with the voluntary or involuntary nature of the restriction im-
posed on the shareholder making the gratuitous transfer.50 This
fact might be evidence that the benefit of restricting the shares
owned by the other stockholders is outweighed by the burden of
the restriction on one's own shares.
Some special problems arise in determining whether a re-
which consolidation of control over the insurance company through the instrumentality
of the voting trust might be thought to imply.
51 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237, 244.
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striction constitutes a disguised testamentary disposition. The
regulations warn that an option or contract to purchase will be
disregarded unless it is determined that the agreement repre-
sents a bona fide business arrangement rather than an attempt to
pass the shares to natural subjects of the transferor's bounty at a
tax discount.51 Since family members frequently are associated
with each other in corporate ownership, it is important that these
devices be precluded.
Estate of Orville B. Littick52 involved what appears to have
been a restriction in contemplation of death. Three brothers
owned all of the stock of a company. They agreed that the stock
held by any of them at death would be sold to the corporation
for $200,000, payable in eight percent corporate debentures.
The agreement further provided that if Orville were the first to
die, his son was to get some equity in the business, with Orville's
estate getting debentures for the balance of his stock. Orville,
who was suffering from cancer at the time of the agreement,
died about a year later. The estate valued the stock at the
agreement price of $200,000, while the Commissioner, arguing
that the agreement transferred value in contemplation of death,
arrived at a value of $257,000 for the stock.
53
The Tax Court considered the agreement to have been
entered into at arm's length and held that the agreement price
controlled for estate tax purposes. The court argued that while it
was likely that Orville would die first, it was not a foregone
conclusion. The agreement was equally binding on the other
brothers. If either of them had died first, his shares would have
been sold to the corporation at the formula price. Yet the
probability of Orville's predeceasing the others was sufficiently
great that the agreement was probably not an approximately
equal exchange of restrictions. It may be, however, that the Tax
Court's finding of an arm's length agreement was justified by the
relatively narrow variation of the agreement price from the fair
market value determined a year later. If the disparity in price
were much greater, courts would be far less likely to view the
agreement as a product of arm's length bargaining.
5 4
More generally, in determining whether mutual stock re-
strictions are entered into at arm's length it would be inappro-
priate to compute, based on mortality tables and life exxpectan-
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
52 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acquiesced in, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 5.
53 INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
.
4 See Clair Giannini Hoffman, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943).
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cies, the precise value to each shareholder of a right to purchase
at death. It is perfectly credible for shareholders operating at
arm's length to enter into arrangements which become operative
on death, in order to obtain the assurance of sale at the formula
price, even though they have disparate- life expectancies. If,
however, one shareholder is substantially older than the others,
or if there is otherwise a substantially greater likelihood that he
will predecease them, the transaction should be scrutinized
closely for elements of gift.55 Where, as in Littick, the gift argu-
ably falls within the contemplation of death provisions, estate tax
consequences might follow as well.
When, however, the factual pattern negates the inference of
a gift or of an agreement in contemplation of death, and the
shares were not transferable free of the option during the
decedent's lifetime, the value of the shares for estate tax pur-
poses should be limited by the option price. Such was the case in
Commissioner v. Bensel, 6 where father and son had spent their
lifetime at loggerheads, but the son was employed in the busi-
ness. In order to induce him to continue in the business, it was
agreed that upon his father's death he would have an option to
buy the father's stock, which represented a controlling block in
the corporation. The price was fair when agreed on. Before the
father's death, however, the shares had appreciated in value to
an amount far in excess of the option price. The court quite
properly held that the option price prevailed.
III. CONCLUSION
The Service and the courts long have sanctioned discounts
from proportionate value in valuing shares in closely held corpo-
rations. Discounts have been justified both for minority stock
interests and for shares subject to restrictions. In many cases, the
discounts are justified. The position of the minority stockholder
in a corporation may prevent him from participating in control
of the business and may adversely affect his ability to realize the
full benefits of owning a proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion. Similarly, if stock is subject to restrictions on transfer, the
shareholder may be unable to realize immediately on asset val-
ues.
Yet these discounts have been applied too broadly. In some
cases, the supposed disability resulting from minority position or
5But cf. Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955).
56 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938).
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restrictionis on transfer may on balance not be a disability in fact,
or may be of little or no consequence to the shareholder, and
should not be taken into account in valuation. Minority discount
in particular appears to have been applied mechanically, upon a
determination that the shares transferred constitute an arithme-
tic minority of the stock of the c6rporation, without adequate
consideration of the realities of the shareholder's participation in
control of the corporation.
The Service's published rulings do not state clearly the
principles which should distinguish the cases which are appro-
priate for discount from those which are not. This is especially
regrettable in the setting in which the issue arises. First, the
taxpayer in preparing an estate or gift tax return must report
the value of the shares transferred. Without clearer published
statements as to how these discounts are to be applied, genuine
doubt may exist for the taxpayer, who understandably may
resolve that doubt in his own favor. Second, Upon audit of the
return and upon judicial determination of any unresolved dis-
pute as to value, the discount may be but one element among
many in a difficult valuation case. Unless the principles for
applying the discount are precisely articulated, the trier of fact
may apply excessive or inappropriate discounts, yet ultimately
determine a value which is not clearly unreasonable. Such im-
precise analysis is not easily corrected. On appeal to a higher
court the value fixed may well be within the range of values,
which an appellate court is bound to accept.5 7 Thus, unless the
Service sets forth carefully articulated standards for applying
discounts, additional confusion and imprecision will continue to
be inculcated into this area of the law.
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a).
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